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Abstract 
 
Using a Safeguards Performance Model, an advanced instrumentation scenario has been 
developed for materials accountability in a UREX+1a reprocessing plant.  This scenario takes 
advantage of new technology to both advance the state of the art in materials accountability and 
reduce plant construction and operational costs.  The model was used to determine the overall 
standard error of the inventory difference, the instrumentation response to misuse scenarios or 
off-normal plant processes, and which areas of the plant may be better served with advanced 
instrumentation.  Some candidate new instrumentation is suggested along with the expected 
improvements in overall accountability.  The conclusions of this work are as follows:  (1) As 
little as five additional plutonium in-process measurement points will provide enough 
information to determine the change of in-process inventory with time—true near real-time 
accountability of plutonium can drastically shorten the detection time of a protracted diversion 
by eliminating the need for a plant flush-out.  (2) Additional measurement points will require 
either rapid, low-error mass spectrometry measurements or rapid on-line non-destructive 
measurements.  Emerging technologies that may be best suited include TARIS (Thermal 
Atomization Resonance Ionization Spectroscopy) and Ultra-High Resolution Spectroscopy.  (3) 
A rapid non-destructive measurement will also be useful for measuring actinides in spent fuel 
assemblies, a continuing gap in materials accountancy.  (4) Uncertainty still exists as to how well 
the rest of the minor actinides and some of the key fission products need to be measured.  
Experimental work is needed to determine the measurement precision of these species in mixed 
solutions. 
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Advancing the State of the Art in Materials 
Accountancy through Safeguards Performance 
Modeling 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Nuclear fuel reprocessing presents the most challenging area within the nuclear fuel cycle to 
safeguard.  A potential UREX+1a plant, which has been proposed as part of the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP), will be the most complicated plant design to date due to an 
increased number of separation steps.  The purpose of this work was to develop an 
instrumentation mapping for the plant along with the statistical analyses that demonstrate the 
ability of the plant to achieve materials accountancy goals. 
 
Plenty of information exists regarding accountancy instrumentation for existing reprocessing 
plants throughout the world.  What sets this work apart is the development of a Safeguards 
Performance Model that allows for virtual testing of the instrumentation mapping.  The model 
was used as a tool for performing a gap analyses and determining instrumentation response to 
off-normal events or diversion pathways.  The model allows for instrumentation design 
optimization to save costs, to develop advanced data correlation strategies, and to determine the 
effect of advanced instrumentation. 
 
This tool will allow plant designers to incorporate Safeguards by Design in the next generation 
of reprocessing plants.  It also can be used to advance the state-of-the-art in material safeguards 
by testing new data correlation strategies.  Beyond the scope of this work, it is also possible to 
extend this model to incorporate plant safety and security as well. 
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2.0 Background 
 
2.1 Materials Accountability Goals 
 
Because of the difficulties of measuring elemental content in mixed reprocessing solutions, 
accountability goals as opposed to requirements have been set up.  The most applicable Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulation, 10CFR74 [1], can be used as a basis for domestic 
safeguards until new guidance is issued.  10CFR74.59(f) requires a 6-month shut-down and 
flush-out to calculate the material balance inventory difference.  The standard error of the 
inventory difference (SEID) must be estimated for any material mass balance—and an SEID > 
0.1% of the active inventory must be examined along with any ID that is greater than three times 
the SEID and 200 g of Pu.  10CFR74.53 requires a statistical test for abrupt diversion that has at 
least a 95% chance of detecting the loss of 2 kg of Pu within three working days for Category 1A 
material and seven working days for Category 1B material.   
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has requirements which are similar and focus 
on the detection of a diversion of one significant quantity of plutonium (8 kg) with 95% 
detection probability.  International safeguards agreements are different than domestic 
safeguards in that they must protect against diversion by the host country.  Verification and data 
authentication play a large role.    
 
Since nuclear material is held up in the plant piping and processing vessels, a flush-out is 
required at the end of a campaign to complete the mass balance.  Discrepancies in the mass 
balance will occur at startup and flushout due to the material hold up.  It is possible that a 
protracted diversion would not be detected until the next flush-out occurs.   
 
For large reprocessing plants (~2000 MT/yr), if the goal is to detect the loss of one significant 
quantity of plutonium in one month, the combined error on the plutonium measurement must be 
smaller than 0.1% to reach the accountability goal.  This is an incredibly difficult level of 
precision to achieve in a large plant.  Current reprocessing plants around the world do not 
achieve this goal which is why additional measures (physical protection, containment, and 
surveillance) are used.   
 
2.2 Advancing the State-of-the-Art 
 
The purpose of this work is to help advance the state-of-the-art in the design of a materials 
accountability system for a reprocessing plant.  Current plants already have their accountability 
practices established and approved, and the argument could be made that existing systems are 
secure enough.  However, new technologies are continuously being developed which can 
improve overall measurement uncertainties and/or decrease the costs of meeting accountability 
requirements.  This modeling work provides a tool for determining the effect of these potential 
improvements. 
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Current accountability systems suffer from two weaknesses: 
 
1. Precision measurements of elemental quantities in mixed isotope reprocessing samples 
take a great deal of time, thus limiting how many areas of the plant can be feasibly 
sampled. 
2. Precision measurements are taken from the plant inputs and the plant outputs, but the in-
process inventory change is not accounted for to a high level of precision. 
 
What this means is that current plants have accurate measurements of the amount of material 
entering and leaving, but there are no elemental measurements to show how the material builds 
up in the processing vessels.  Various predictive models can be used along with bulk process 
monitoring measurements (flow rates, tank volumes, etc.), but a plant flushout is required to 
close out the mass balance.   
 
A true near real-time accountability system would be able to track the change of the plant 
inventory (for elemental quantities) along with the input and output measurements.  Such a 
system, if it achieved a high enough precision, could possibly eliminate the need for a plant 
flushout and interim inventory measurements.  In effect, a mass balance could be completed on 
the order of every 8 hours.  This paper will show how this goal could be achieved—specifically 
what the properties of new instrumentation must be to move toward this type of an advanced 
accountability system.  
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3.0 Safeguards Performance Model 
 
The Safeguards Performance Model is a tool for examining advanced accountancy systems and 
new technology in a reprocessing plant.  Simulink (a simulation software package that runs 
under MATLAB) has been used to develop a transient flow model of a UREX+1a reprocessing 
plant.  This model tracks cold chemicals, bulk fluid flow, solids, and the individual elemental 
quantities of U, Pu, Np, Am, Cm, Cs, and Sr.  Expected separation efficiencies are specified to 
determine the quantity of nuclear material going into different streams.  Measurement models are 
used to simulate an expected measurement from a particular piece of instrumentation.  The 
following sections describe the mass balance, measurement models, and statistical analyses in 
more detail. 
 
3.1 Mass Balance 
 
The Simulink model is broken down into five different sub-models based on the UREX+1a 
process: Front end, uranium extraction (UREX), cesium/strontium extraction (CCD-PEG), 
transuranic actinide extraction (TRUEX), and rare earth fission product extraction 
(TALSPEAK).  Dividing the plant up in this manner will be useful for potential changes to the 
separation steps in the future.  An entire plant simulation runs each model in sequence.  The 
model currently does not include product conversion at the end of each separation step, but this 
can be added later if appropriate.  The final product from each separation step (in dissolved fluid 
form) is used as the plant output. 
 
A complete mass balance was used as the basis of the model, so at any instant during a 
simulation, the total mass entering a processing vessel equals the total mass leaving it unless the 
vessel inventory is changing.  More detailed information about the mass balance is given in 
reference 2.  The data used to build the model and assumptions comes from the AMUSE code 
developed at Argonne National Laboratory.  Every stream in the model contains information 
about the volume and mass flow rate, the concentrations of the 7 key elements tracked, and the 
solids flow rate where appropriate (at the front end).  Separation efficiencies are specified in the 
dissolver and the contactors to determine the percentage of each element going into a specific 
output stream.  Section 3.3 includes pertinent data about the flow rates and separation 
efficiencies.  
 
Tanks are modeled assuming that the fluid phase is well mixed, a good assumption for 
accountability tanks but not for all areas of the plant.  In other words, it is assumed that fluid 
samples taken from anywhere within the tank at the same time instant would have the same 
composition.  The modeling of the contactor trains is less intuitive, but simplified since details 
about the individual contactors may not be known (from the materials accountability standpoint).  
Each contactor train is broken up into 3 different model blocks to represent the extraction, strip, 
and scrub operations.  The specified fluid inventory within each such block is based on the 
number of stages within the contactor.  Each block has two inputs and two outputs (organic and 
nitric acid), and the elemental content in the outputs is defined by specified separation 
efficiencies. 
 
13 
3.2 Measurement Models 
 
A universal measurement block has been designed for use in any location within the model.  This 
block can be used to simulate any type of desired measurement having to do with mass, volume, 
flow rate, or concentration.  The block simulates a real measurement, which is imperfect, and 
then logs the measurement history as a variable in MATLAB.  Once the measurements are 
collected, statistical tests can then be used to analyze the data. 
 
Each measurement block contains parameters that are supplied by the user.  The user specifies 
which stream variable is to be measured (such as the bulk fluid flow or an individual element’s 
concentration), sampling period, random error, systematic error, drift, and calibration period.  
The data from this measurement is recorded into a matrix with one value for each time period.   
 
3.3 UREX+1a Model 
 
The following five figures show the complete UREX+1a model in Simulink.  Plant equipment is 
labeled below the block, and each type of equipment shows the number of in-flows and out-
flows.  The main dissolver solution output from each sub-model becomes the input for the next 
sub-model.  Measurement blocks are labeled by the measurement type below the block.  
 
The measurement blocks at first glance will appear to be excessive.  The measurements shown in 
Figures 1-5 are for an advanced plant that may be able to take advantage of technology advances 
to include more in-process measurements.  For a more conservative approach that only uses 
measurements that are available on plants today, much of this added measurement data can be 
treated as if it did not exist.  Sections 4 and 5 will go into more detail about the differences 
between a baseline and advanced instrumentation scenario. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Front End Model 
 
Measurement of a tank typically 
requires a level indicator and an 
analytical sample 
The dissolver, hulls wash, and 
centrifuge are modeled as one 
block—the % fuel entrained in 
the hulls can be changed 
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Figure 1 shows the Front End Model which begins with dissolution of the spent fuel.  The 
dissolver tank, hulls wash tank, and centrifuge are all modeled as one block for simplicity.  The 
dissolved fuel moves on to a surge tank, accountability tank, and UREX feed adjust tank.  The 
accountability tank is where the first precision measurement of the solution occurs.  The output 
from the Front End moves on to the UREX extraction. 
 
The UREX extraction is shown in Figure 2.  This extraction removes U/Tc from the dissolved 
fuel.  The incoming solution from the UREX feed adjust tank goes directly into a train of 
centrifugal contactors.  It would be possible to model each contactor separately using Simulink, 
but for the purposes of this work it was adequate to combine contactors into three blocks 
representing extraction, scrub, and strip.  Each block has an aqueous solution input and organic 
solvent input along with an extractant and raffinate.  The separation efficiency of each element 
tracked can be specified.  The separation efficiencies of the three blocks were set so that the 
overall separation efficiency was equal to the results of the Argonne AMUSE code. 
 
The end of the UREX extraction includes the UREX holding tank that contains the separated U 
and Tc product.  The organic solvent is recycled in a mixer-settler tank before being reused in the 
extraction.  Note that measurement blocks are included on the two tanks at the end of the process 
as well as the first block of the extraction.  These will be discussed in later sections. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: UREX Extraction 
 
The leftover raffinate from the UREX extraction moves on to the CCD-PEG extraction, which is 
shown in Figure 3.  This extraction removes the Cs/Sr from the dissolved fuel.  Again, the 
contactors are modeled as three blocks, and the final product solution is contained in the Cs/Sr 
holding tank.  Measurement blocks are shown for both the holding tank and the mixer-settler 
tank.  
 
   
Potential need for 
advanced NDA 
instrument for Pu 
Contactor trains were modeled as 
three blocks each with two inputs 
and two outputs—the separation 
efficiencies can be specified
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Figure 3: CCD-PEG Extraction 
 
The leftover raffinate from the CCD-PEG extraction contains all transuranic elements and all 
fission products except Cs/Sr.  This raffinate moves on to the TRUEX extraction shown in 
Figure 4.  The TRUEX extraction removes the transuranic elements and rare earth fission 
products from the rest of the fission products.  A stripper and reduction tank are required before 
the TRUEX contactors to adjust the chemistry for this extraction.  
 
Figure 4: TRUEX Extraction 
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The rest of the flow chart looks similar to the previous two extractions.  The TRUEX raffinate 
contains the left-over fission products and will be fabricated into a high level waste form.  The 
TRUEX product goes to the TRUEX holding tank and contains the transuranics and rare earth 
fission products.   
 
This solution then moves on to the final extraction, the TALSPEAK extraction, shown in Figure 
5.  A feed adjust tank prepares the solution for extraction, which removes the rare earth fission 
products from the transuranics.  The rare earth fission products are collected in the RE product 
tank—this solution will be combined with the other fission products in fabrication of the high 
level waste form.  The raffinate from TALSPEAK contains the final transuranic product that can 
be fabricated into a fuel. 
 
A diversion block was added to the transuranic product stream for use in testing a diversion 
scenario.  This block can be set up to divert a fraction of the entire stream or individual elements 
(though diversion of the entire stream is more realistic).  The starting time of the diversion can be 
set along with the length of diversion.  In this manner it can be used to test the instrumentation 
response to either abrupt or protracted diversion of material. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: TALSPEAK Extraction 
 
Diversion block pulls out 
specified components and 
can be placed anywhere 
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3.4 Time Dependence 
 
The Safeguards Performance Model is a transient model that includes time dependence.  The 
initial conditions of all components can be specified, and the time of the run can be set.  For 
example, to model startup the initial elemental quantities in all components will be set to zero.  
After startup, nuclear material will begin to build up in the processing vessels until a steady-state 
condition is achieved.  Likewise, to model flushout the feed is set to zero until the nuclear 
material within the plant gets completely flushed out of the system.   
 
The feed can also be changed during a run to represent a switch to a different burnup or even 
different type of fuel.  Then the transient concentrations throughout the plant can be tracked.  For 
all measurement blocks throughout the plant, the measurement will log both the actual value and 
the simulated measurement value.   
 
For this model, the dissolver was assumed to be a batch process, while the contactors are 
continuous.  The surge tank, accountability tank, and UREX adjust tank at the front end were 
used to maintain a continuous flow to the UREX extraction.  The Simulink model is able to 
adequately mimic how this would occur in a real plant by allowing the tank volumes to fill and 
empty.   
 
The time dependence makes it possible to simulate the turn around time for measurements 
throughout the process.  The measurements are logged as a function of time in Matlab arrays, 
and then these measurements can be analyzed later for SEID or instrumentation response to 
normal operation and misuse scenarios.  The following chapter discusses the instrumentation in 
more detail.  
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4.0 Baseline Instrumentation List 
 
The model was configured with two instrumentation lists, a baseline and an advanced mapping.  
These two lists were used to compare the effect of adding additional instrumentation to the 
overall safeguards performance of the system.  The baseline instrumentation list includes 
materials accountancy instrumentation that would likely be installed on a reprocessing plant built 
today.  This list is based on established instrumentation in use around the world and is made up 
of instrumentation that is currently available off-the-shelf.   
  
4.1 Previous Work 
 
The International Target Values 2000 reference [3] forms the basis for much of the baseline 
instrumentation in the model.  This reference provides typically achievable uncertainties for 
mass, volume, and density measurements as well as a detailed list of the uncertainties of U and 
Pu concentration measurements using various laboratory techniques.  The difficulty with the 
current practice is that all existing reprocessing plants only separate U and Pu, so they do not 
need to deal with challenge of measuring the other minor actinides or Cs/Sr.  The accountability 
of a UREX+1a plant is further complicated since the requirements for measuring the minor 
actinides and Cs/Sr are not set yet.   
 
The instrument locations for a UREX+1a plant are based on a number of past references, mostly 
funded through GNEP or AFCI projects of the past [4,5,6,7,8,9].  In some cases the 
instrumentation choices are estimates given the uncertainty regarding future regulations.    
 
4.2 Instrumentation Mapping 
 
Figure 6 shows the instrumentation mapping for the baseline design.  This figure shows the 
UREX+1a flow chart with the key instrumentation points shown in red.  Traditional materials 
accountability includes a relatively small number of measurement points.  In this case, the input 
measurement is taken at the accountability tank, while the outputs are taken from the five 
product/waste forms indicated.  One additional measurement is taken of the washed hulls.  
Traditional accounting requires the mass balance to be completed at plant flushout since the in-
process inventory is not measured. 
 
For measurement points 1-6, the total plutonium measurement is found using a level indicator on 
a tank for volume plus a concentration measurement in a sample.  For all cases the level indicator 
was assumed to give a volume measurement with 0.1% random and systematic errors.  Note that 
these errors are only possible if great care is taken in calibration and measurement procedures 
[3]. 
 
Table 1 shows more detail about the instrumentation parameters for the concentration 
measurements including the expected instrument, random and systematic errors, and the 
measurement turn around time.  The table is broken down into each element to make it easier to 
see how many measurements go into a mass balance for a particular element.  
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The measurement technique for the minor actinides is somewhat uncertain as the accounting 
requirements for these species have not been set.  Alpha spectroscopy has been proposed as part 
of the Engineering Alternatives Study [7], but it would require a significant amount of time in 
the radiochemistry lab to separate the components and perform measurements.  Hybrid K-edge 
densitometry may be more suited for these measurements.  Either way, the measurement of the 
minor actinides is a gap that needs to be closed with further research and development.  The 
measurement uncertainties listed for alpha spectroscopy are only estimates based on one 
reference [10], so more work is needed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Baseline Instrumentation Mapping 
 
The standard measurement technique for U and Pu at the key accountability points is Isotope 
Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS)—this measurement requires lengthy chemical separation 
before the measurement.  Titration (TITR) is used for separated U products.  Laboratory alpha 
spectroscopy (α spec) may be used for minor actinides, but it also requires lengthy chemical 
separation.  Gamma spectroscopy (γ spec) using high purity germanium detectors can be used for 
some of the product or waste forms to varying degrees of uncertainty.  Liquid scintillation may 
KMP 1
KMP 4
KMP 5
KMP 6
KMP 3
KMP 2
KMP 7 
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be used for measuring the Tc and Sr product.  Finally, in many areas of the plant, gross alpha and 
gamma measurements (gross α,γ) may be used for rough measurement of material. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Instrumentation Parameters 
 
 
4.3 Standard Error of the Inventory Difference 
 
Using the expected measurement errors as shown in Table 1, it is possible to determine the SEID 
for each elemental mass balance.  Only the actinides have enough information to complete a 
mass balance—the fission product measurements are taken for the purpose of waste 
characterization.   
 
It is useful to note that this SEID only covers the input and output measurements in the plant—
in-process inventory is not included.  Therefore this SEID is based on the assumption that all in-
process inventory is liberated from the plant during flushout.  It also means that this error can 
only be calculated at plant flushout, so a potential diversion may take a while to detect. 
 
The SEID is calculated as a mass rate in kg/hr.  Table 2 shows example measurement values for 
the actinides along with the measurement uncertainty.  The bottom row shows the calculation of 
the inventory difference between the plant outputs and the plant input.  The uncertainty on this 
inventory difference is the SEID for the five actinides.   
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Table 2: Standard Error for the Baseline Mass Balance 
 
For example, the SEID for plutonium was 0.017 kg/hr.  In order for a protracted diversion to be 
detected with a 95% detection probability, the diversion would need to be greater than 3.3 x 
SEID, or 0.0561 kg/hr.  If a protracted diversion of material is kept below this mass flow rate, 
then it is unlikely to be detected.  Significant quantities of the other minor actinides are not 
defined, but the quantities of Np, Am, and Cm even in a large plant are small in comparison to 
the amount of Pu.   
 
4.4 Response to Off-Normal Events 
 
The difficulty with measuring only the inputs and outputs is that there are large differences at the 
beginning and end of the run.  To demonstrate this discrepancy, the Pu mass balance was used 
(column 2 in Table 2).  At startup, Pu is going to accumulate in the process vessels, so the Pu 
inputs will be greater than the sum of the Pu outputs.  At the end of the run, during flush-out, Pu 
will still be coming out of the plant even though no fuel is being fed.   
 
The Safeguards Performance Model was used to demonstrate this effect using a one month run 
assuming standard pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel.  Flush-out was started at hour 620.  
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Figure 7 shows the result.  A large negative inventory difference is present at the beginning of 
the run, and a large positive inventory difference is present during flush-out.  In between, the 
process is at steady-state so the inventory difference varies slightly around zero.  After flushout, 
a balance of the net inventory difference will be very close to zero during normal operation. 
 
Figure 7: Inventory Difference using Traditional Accounting 
 
The performance measure of the baseline instrumentation is how well it responds to an off-
normal event.  Such events could include leaks, problems with the separations steps, or misuse 
scenarios.  The diversion block described in section 3.3 was used to simulate a misuse scenario.  
Figure 8 shows the effect of a diversion of 8 kg of Pu spread out over 100 hours.  The model 
assumed the diversion of 4.2% of the TRU product stream starting at hour 50 and ending at hour 
150.  Although the diversion is evident on this plot, it is not difficult to see how a diversion could 
be hidden in the plant startup or flushout phase or during any other plant transient.  Such a 
diversion would not be detected until the full mass balance was performed. 
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Figure 8: Inventory Difference with a Diversion Event using Traditional Accounting 
 
The goal of this work was to determine instrumentation gaps and improvements which can more 
quickly and easily detect these types of misuse scenarios.  The following section describes 
advanced instrumentation which may drastically improve the state-of-the-art of materials 
accountability. 
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5.0 Advanced Instrumentation List 
 
Three goals have been identified in developing advanced instrumentation for future reprocessing 
plants: 
1. Identify gaps in traditional accounting and determine if new instrumentation can help fill 
those gaps. 
2. Identify ways to reduce plant costs or use new instrumentation to influence the overall 
cost of the plant design. 
3. Determine the measurement characteristics required to help guide instrumentation 
development. 
 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 describe the lessons learned from this analysis.  Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 
describe an advanced instrumentation list and the model runs that were performed.  Finally, 
section 5.6 summarizes these results into an advanced instrumentation requirement list that 
others in the safeguards community can use as a guide in developing new measurement 
techniques. 
 
5.1 Input and Output Measurements 
 
The current uncertainty of the measurements on the accountability tank and the outputs from 
mass spectrometry are about as good as they are going to get.  It is unlikely that new 
instrumentation will push the uncertainties much below 0.1% simply because of the realities of 
doing laboratory measurements.  Advances in these locations should focus instead on decreasing 
the measurement time.  Given that a typical mixed isotope reprocessing sample may have 
measure turn-around time of about 8 hours, accountancy measurements require a large amount of 
time and money to keep the laboratories staffed. 
 
A large gap in accounting is the measurement of the plutonium in the spent fuel coming into the 
plant.  No technique exists for measuring elemental content in spent fuel rods with low 
uncertainty until the fuel is dissolved at the accountability tank.  For this reason, current plants 
use the accountability tank as the input and rely on physical protection and other barriers to 
protect spent fuel at the front end of the plant.   
 
5.2 In-Process Inventory 
 
The in-process inventory is another gap in accountability.  While current plants do keep track of 
bulk material flow (total volumes or masses of solution), elemental content from the plant 
processing vessels is not measured.  Therefore, there is no data on the change of Pu inventory 
within the plant as a function of time—leading to the need for a plant flush-out to complete the 
mass balance.  If it is possible to determine the complete plant inventory change based on in-
process measurements, it might be possible to completely eliminate the need for a periodic plant 
flushout. 
 
Measuring every internal tank and contactor could be expensive.  Therefore, as a first step, it is 
useful to determine whether some areas in the plant would not require measurement for various 
statistical reasons.  Many locations in the plant may only have small volumes being processed or 
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may be expected to only contain trace quantities of nuclear material.  These areas can potentially 
be ignored. 
 
Figure 9 shows the plant schematic with the expected tank or contactor volumes (in Liters) 
shown in blue.  All of the effluent wash stages and the CCD-PEG, TRUEX, and TALSPEAK 
contactors contain very small quantities of material in comparison to the tanks.  Therefore, the 
relative amount of fissionable material in these processing steps can be neglected from a mass 
balance, which in turn eliminates the need for measurement instrumentation at these locations. 
 
All of the mixer-settler tanks, which are used for the recycled solvent, are expected to only 
contain trace quantities of nuclear material.  Gross gamma and alpha measurements of these 
tanks will likely be required for process monitoring to ensure nuclear material is not present. In 
this sense, these areas act as confirmatory measurements to make sure the amount of nuclear 
material is negligible.  By taking advantage of this process control information, four more in-
process measurements have been eliminated.  
 
  
Figure 9: In-Process Volumes 
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That leaves four additional tanks and the UREX Contactor train that must be measured with 
accuracy to determine the in-process inventory.  New measurement techniques that can 
drastically speed up a mass spectrometry measurement may open the door to taking additional 
samples from the four additional tanks.  A non-destructive measurement technique will be 
required to measure the amount of material in the UREX contactor train since sampling is nearly 
impossible due to the nature of contactor operation.  Fortunately, the total volume of the UREX 
contactors is small compared to the rest of the tanks, so the measurement technique does not 
require low uncertainty (<5% will be adequate).  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the front end of the plant (before the accountability tank) was 
excluded from this exercise.  The accountability tank is the first time that precise data on the 
plant inputs in received.  If new measurement techniques are able to precisely measure actinides 
in spent fuel (non-destructively with uncertainty < 0.5%), then the in-process measurements of 
the front end will become important.  Future work will investigate the front end in more detail.    
 
5.3 Advanced Instrumentation Mapping 
 
Figure 10 shows the advanced instrumentation mapping with new measurement areas indicated 
in green and blue.  These measurement points would be required to determine the change in in-
process Pu inventory with time (to prevent the need for plant flushout).   
 
Key measurement points 8, 9, 10, and 11 are the mixer-settler tanks, which are expected to only 
contain trace quantities of nuclear material.  Gross alpha and gamma measurements with a 
relatively high uncertainty are adequate at these locations since the amount of actinides is so low 
compared to other areas of the plant.  The gross alpha and gamma measurements combined with 
the level indicator will provide confirmation that only very small quantities of actinides should 
exist in these locations.  This instrumentation will be required for process monitoring, so it does 
not represent an increase in instrumentation costs. 
 
Key measurement points 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 represent new capability.  These locations all 
contain statistically significant quantities of plutonium so must be either sampled or measured 
non-destructively to determine the plant inventory change.  The UREX feed adjust tank, TRUEX 
stripper, TRUEX reduction vessel, and TALSPEAK feed adjust tank all contain significant 
volumes and significant quantities of plutonium.  These tanks should be sampled and measured 
with low uncertainty in the advanced accountability scenario.  The UREX contactors will contain 
plutonium only in the first set of stages for which the total volume of material would be about 
280 L.  The quantity of plutonium at this location is small compared to the rest of the plant, so a 
plutonium measurement with uncertainty around 5% would be adequate.  A non-destructive 
technique could be used in this location. 
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Figure 10: Advanced Instrumentation Mapping 
 
 
Table 3 shows the desired plutonium concentration measurement parameters for the additional 
measurement points.  These parameters point to the need for either rapid on-line analysis of 
plutonium (at low error) or more rapid laboratory analyses that allow for more samples to be 
taken.  The UREX contactors require some type of NDA measurement that can determine the 
plutonium content from an unusual geometry, but fortunately the error does not need to be very 
low.   
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Table 3: Advanced Measurement Parameter Requirements 
 
 
5.4 Standard Error of the Inventory Difference 
 
Under the advanced instrumentation scenario, the standard error can be calculated at any time as 
opposed to just at plant flushout.  Not only does this make it much quicker to detect off-normal 
events, but it may prevent the need for plant flushout to save operating costs.  The model 
assumptions for the five advanced measurement locations are shown in Table 3, although the 
equipment was not specified since this is a requirements list. 
 
An assumption was made that only Pu would need to be measured in near-real time using this 
advanced instrumentation scenario.  In other words, all of the additional instrumentation would 
only focus on Pu measurements as opposed to all of the actinides.  This would likely be 
sufficient since Pu is the critical material for safeguards, since the rest of the minor actinides are 
present in much lower quantities, and since the uranium coming from a reprocessing plant is not 
an ideal material for weapon-making.  The overall system, then, will account for Pu in near-real 
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time taking into account input, output, and in-process measurements, but all other species will 
only take into account input and output measurements. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of a 360 hour run using the model along with the advanced 
instrumentation.  Each column represents a different processing point and the plutonium 
measurement at that point.  All measurements are given in kg of Pu at that particular point in 
time.  The final four columns show the plant input, sum of the plant outputs, the in-process 
inventory change, and finally a calculation of the inventory difference (all in kg/hr).   
 
At plant startup as the in-process inventory is changing, the inventory difference is on the order 
of 0.1 to 0.2 kg/hr.  Once steady-state is reached, the inventory difference is around 0.01 to 0.02 
kg/hr.  Of more importance is the uncertainty in the measurement, around 0.5 kg/hr.  Although 
this uncertainty is somewhat high, a complete mass balance is being completed every 8 hours 
without a plant flushout.  In 8 hours, there is not enough time to hide a diversion of 8 kg of Pu 
within the measurement uncertainty. 
 
The inventory difference from this run is shown in Figure 11.  As expected, the inventory 
difference hovers very close to zero since the discrepancy between input and output 
measurements is offset by the additional measures of the change of in-process inventory. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Inventory Difference using Advanced Accounting 
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Table 4: Advanced Instrumentation Run (Values in kg/hr) 
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Table 4 (continued): Advanced Instrumentation Run (Values in kg/hr) 
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Table 4 (continued): Advanced Instrumentation Run (Values in kg/hr) 
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5.5 Diversion Scenario Response 
 
The same diversion scenario used in Chapter 4 for the baseline instrumentation list was also used 
here for the advanced instrumentation case.  This diversion was a protracted diversion of 8 kg of 
Pu spread over 100 hours.  Figure 12 shows the mass balance during the run. 
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Figure 12: Inventory Difference with a Diversion Event using Advanced Accounting 
 
Figure 12 clearly shows that the protracted diversion event will be detected.  The detection will 
occur almost immediately when the inventory difference passes an alarm condition.  Future work 
will put the statistics into the model to include the alarm conditions. 
 
 
5.6 Advanced Instrumentation Requirements 
 
As a result of this study, the following list of conclusions has been drawn to help guide the 
priorities for the development of new instrumentation: 
 
• Existing measurements of U and Pu at accountability tanks and the front and back end of 
the process reach low levels of uncertainty and are unlikely to improve. 
• Accountability advances at the front and back ends should instead focus on drastically 
reducing the measurement time through new instrumentation, more automation, or both. 
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• Low uncertainty measurements of solid spent fuel continues to be a gap in accounting—
new instrumentation capable of measuring Pu and other species with less than 0.5% 
uncertainty should be a priority in the research. 
• Measurements of in-process inventory, specifically Pu, can drastically improve the 
timeliness of detection while at the same time reducing plant construction and operating 
costs—these additional measurements will likely only be practical if a rapid, low 
uncertainty measurement technique is developed. 
• The measurement of Pu in the UREX contactors will require an NDA technique due to 
the unique geometry and operation of contactors—5% uncertainty should be adequate for 
this measurement. 
• Depending on the plant configuration, additional measurements of the other minor 
actinides (Np/Am/Cm) and some fission products (Tc/Cs/Sr) may be required—
techniques like hybrid K-Edge densitometry should be investigated for use in measuring 
minor actinides, but traditional gamma spectrometry should be adequate for measurement 
of fission products of interest. 
 
The advanced measurement technologies most likely to achieve these goals include the 
following: 
 
• Ultra-High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy or Microcalorimetry [11] – A non-
destructive gamma ray spectrometer using arrays of microcalorimeters for measuring 
radioactive species, this technology has already been demonstrated to achieve a dramatic 
improvement in resolution compared to existing high purity germanium detectors.  Such 
a technique may allow for low uncertainty measurements of solid spent fuel as well as 
solution from any processing vessel. 
• Thermal Atomization Resonance Ionization Spectroscopy (TARIS) [12] – A destructive 
technique for rapidly measuring mixed reprocessing solutions with low uncertainty, 
TARIS could dramatically reduce the turn around time for analytical samples and open 
the door to additional sampling of in-process vessels.   
• Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (HKED) – HKED is well-established for measurements of 
U and Pu, but additional research is required to determine its use for measuring the other 
minor actinides in the transuranic product. 
35 
6.0 Conclusions 
 
Some key qualitative conclusions have been drawn from the development and testing of the 
Safeguards Performance Model: 
 
• As little as five additional plutonium measurement points will provide enough 
information to determine the plant inputs and outputs along with the change of in-process 
inventory with time. 
• These additional measurement points will require either rapid, low-error mass 
spectrometry measurements or rapid on-line non-destructive measurements.  Emerging 
technologies that may be best suited include TARIS (Thermal Atomization Resonance 
Ionization Spectroscopy) and Ultra-High Resolution Spectroscopy. 
• A near real-time mass balance of the in-process Pu inventory change can drastically 
shorten the detection time of a misuse scenario by eliminating the need for a plant flush-
out.  At the same time, eliminating the need for a plant flush-out can save considerable 
operational costs. 
• If a low error measurement of plutonium in spent fuel assemblies is available, it would 
also be useful to determine the in-process inventory of the vessels before accountability.  
Ultra High Resolution Spectroscopy may be best suited as an advanced measurement for 
this purpose.   
• Uncertainty still exists as to how well the rest of the minor actinides and some of the key 
fission products need to be measured.  Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry could be useful for 
these measurements.  Experimental work is needed to determine the measurement 
precision of these species in mixed solutions. 
 
Future work will expand the model to include more detail at the front and back end of the plant.  
In-process measurements of the front end need to be included along with the effect of adding a 
low-error measurement of spent fuel assemblies.  The back end of the plant is missing the 
product conversion equipment to convert the liquid processing solutions to solid products and 
wastes.  These areas will also need to be included in the in-process inventory analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
7.0 References 
 
1. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR74, available at www.gpoaccess.gov/ 
cfr/index.html (July, 2007). 
2. B.B. Cipiti, P.E. Rexroth, N.L. Ricker, “Safeguards Performance Modeling of a 
UREX+1a Reprocessing Plant,” SAND2007-6586 (October, 2007). 
3. H. Aigner et al., “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in 
Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” ESARDA Bulletin, No. 31 (2000). 
4. M.M. Pickrell & K. Budlong-Sylvester, “Safeguards Alternatives for a UREX+ Facility 
NA-NE Joint Fuel Cycle Facility Design Project Technology Demonstration to Enhance 
the Safeguards of a UREX+ Facility,” LA-UR-06-1075 (November 2005). 
5. J. Law et al., “Preliminary Evaluation of Sampling, Process Instrumentation, and MC&A 
Needs for the Engineering Scale Demonstration,” INL/EXT-06-11064 (2006). 
6. “Scoping Study for the Spent Fuel Treatment Facility,” Washington Group International, 
Job No. 26861-004 (January 2004). 
7. “Engineering Alternatives Studies for Separations Analytical Scoping Study,” Savannah 
River National Laboratory, SAN-G-ESR-G-00014 (April 2007). 
8. “Engineering Alternatives Studies for Separations Preliminary Safeguards Strategy,” 
Savannah River National Laboratory, MCA-G-ESR-G-00013 (April 2007). 
9. “Engineering Alternatives Studies for Separations Process Data Sheet for Sampling and 
Analytical System,” Savannah River National Laboratory, SAN-G-PDS-G-00013 (April 
2007). 
10. N. Shinohara & N. Kohno, “A Comparative Study of Alpha-spectrometric Methods for 
Determination of Americium and Curium in Spent Fuel,” International Journal of 
Radiation Applied Instruments Part A, 40(4), 346-348 (1989). 
11. W.B. Doriese et al., “14-Pixel, Multiplexed Array of Gamma-Ray Microcalorimeters 
with 47 eV Energy Resolution at 103 keV,” Applied Physics Letters, 90, 193508 (2007). 
12. B.B. Cipiti, K.C. Holt, T.J. Whitaker & J.T. Pride, “Advanced Mass Spectrometry 
Techniques for Reprocessing Accountancy,” SAND2007-6653 (October 2007). 
37 
Distribution 
 
1 Mike Miller 
 P.O. Box 1663 
 Los Alamos, NM  87545 
 
1 Frank Goldner 
 NE-54/Germantown Building 
 U.S. Department of Energy 
 1000 Independence Ave., S.W. 
 Washington, DC  20585-1290 
 
1 N. Lawrence Ricker 
 Department of Chemical Engineering 
 University of Washington 
 Seattle, WA  98195-1750 
 
4  0747 Ben Cipiti, 6774 
1 0747 Ken Sorenson, 6774 
1 0736 John Kelly, 6770 
 
1 0899 Technical Library, 9536 (1 electronic copy) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
